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substantively most instructive to view it as contributing to a line of inquiry initiated by Truman Bewley (I983) and Edward Green (I987). Bewley's paper was the first attempt to imagine in detail what an entire society would have to look like if the behaviour of individual households in it were to be consistent with Friedman's (1957) permanent income hypothesis. Of course, it is this step that converts Friedman's theory of individual behaviour into a general equilibrium theory of distribution. Bewley took a particular market structure, necessarily incomplete in the Arrow-Debreu sense, as a given. Green took matters a step further to take the information structure of the economy as given, and then derived the efficient allocation implied by this information structure under specific parametric assumptions about consumer preferences.
Since then many others, notably Taub (i 990), Phelan and Townsend (i99I), Marimon and Marcet (i 990), and Thomas and Worrall (i 990) have used theoretical or numerical methods or both to work out the implications of other specific assumptions on preferences and information structures. As empirical work by Townsend (I989), Mace (i99i), Cochrane (i99i), and others amply demonstrates, the Bewley-Green viewpoint leads to new and extremely interesting ways of interpreting data on household income and consumption expenditures. I think it has equally radical implications for the way we think about distributional dynamics. where c, is consumption of the one good and {Jt} is a sequence of iid taste shocks, independent across agents. Let the distribution of the shock be ,u, normalised so that the mean shock value is unity. Throughout, I will assume that the current period utility function U(c) takes the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form: U(c) = (I/y) (Cy -0, y I.
When y = o, U(c) = ln (c).
The only decision this society has to make each period is how to distribute the fixed stock of goods y over these many consumers. Even if households are identical ex ante, they will receive different idiosyncratic taste shocks as time passes. Depending on the resource allocating mechanism used, these shocks will affect their current consumption and also their entitlements to future consumption. Our objective will be to see how the distribution of entitlements evolves under different assumptions about the way resources are allocated.
I consider five distinct resource allocation mechanisms. The first two, examined in Section II, will serve as benchmarks: autarky, and the fullinformation efficient allocations. There are many of both, for the same reason that there are many possible endowment points and many points on the contract curve in an Edgeworth Box. In Section III I consider a market system in which the only marketable asset is money, and in which all consumption must be financed with cash-in-advance. This is the pure currency economy (in Wicksell's terminology) studied in my (1978) paper. In this economy, each household owns the endowment stream y but this claim is not a marketable security. Then in Section IV I go to the opposite extreme, to study what Wicksell called a pure credit economy, in which claims to future endowment are perfectly marketable -tradeable without restriction -and in which money disappears from use.
Finally, in Section V, I will characterise the efficient allocations that are incentive compatible -that respect the fact that the idiosyncratic 0 shocks are private information. This analysis, taken in its essentials from Atkeson and Lucas (i99I), will give us a standard against which we can evaluate the two market allocations I have just described that is more germaine than the unattainable full-information ideal. Even so, we will see that both market allocations fall short in terms of welfare. Are there other market arrangements that do better than these two? Maybe so, but I will explain why Atkeson and I concluded that full efficiency, even respecting the privacy of information, is unattainable through any set of purely private arrangements. Households in this economy will want to pool the idiosyncratic risk they all face, or have this done on their behalf by the planner. Think of the planner as doing this in the following way. First, all households are divided into groups according to their share values, all members of a given group having equal share holdings a. These groups are to remain forever separate from one another. Within any group a, consumers will receive a consumption allocation c(a, 6), depending on their taste shock, and they will receive an allocation g(a, 6) of end-of-period shares. These allocations must satisfy: fc(a,0) dlt < ay (I) and Jg(a, ) d,u < a, for all a,
since both goods and shares allocated must be met with the resources of each group a in isolation.
Next period, the subset of group a that received g(a, 0) apiece for any fixed 0 is again treated in isolation, with consumption averaging g(a, 6) y and new shares averaging g(a, 0), and so on, ad infinitum. Since there is a continuum of households to begin with, we can imagine that all of these ever-proliferating subgroups have a continuum of agents, so there are always plenty of other households to pool risks with. Even so, with general utility, the restriction that the planner must treat each subgroup in isolation from the rest would be inconsistent with efficiency: People at different wealth levels may have 
Notice that as the variance of 0 approaches zero or as y approaches the riskneutrality value of unity, consumption approaches its autarchy level of ay. Otherwise, consumption is an increasing function of the urgency to consume. Neither of these two allocations is of much interest in its own right. Autarky is easy to improve upon, while full insurance is impossible to attain under realistic assumptions about what one person can know about another. They will serve as benchmarks for more complicated, intermediate cases.' It is interesting to note, however, that these two very different allocations have a common implication for distributional dynamics: any initial distribution of relative utilities will be maintained over time. Thus if we begin with a utility distribution concentrated at a single point -either because we have a preference for equality or because we imagine risk averse agents selecting initial entitlements in some optimally-designed, pre-existing lottery -this distribution will remain equal for all time.
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III. A PURE CURRENCY EQUILIBRIUM
Neither of the two allocations considered so far involves anything like realistic exchange. In the first, autarky, there is no trade at all. The second, fullinformation, allocations could be attained by trade in a full set of Arrow-Debreu markets, but only if everyone's private shock were a matter of public information. In this section, I want to turn to a specific market set-up that is consistent with the privacy of information. It was designed for thinking about the demand for money, but will serve to advance the present discussion as well. Let every household in the economy have the same endowment stream y, but treat claims to future endowments as untradeable. To ensure that money will be held, assume that no household can consume its own endowment. Instead, the endowment must be sold for fiat currency, which can later be spent to purchase goods from other households. No exchange except contemporaneous money-for-goods trades is permitted. There are many ways -plain and fancy -to motivate these conventions, but my present interest is in their consequences, not in their rationale.2
In this situation, the state of the economy is determined by the distribution 5S ( 
If there is a per capita, nominal money supply of M, then equating the magnitude (I 3) to M/p gives the equilibrium price level p. Of course, Walras Law implies that this same price equates the demand and supply of goods as well. The difference equation (1 2) describes the evolution of any individual's cash holdings, given that society as a whole is described by the invariant distribution 0. It does not describe the process by which society converges to the invariant distribution from some given initial position, since if such convergence occurs the price level will be changing along the transition path whereas the function g describes optimal behaviour only if the price level is constant. Nonetheless, it seems to me a reasonable conjecture that the invariant distribution qS describes the limiting behaviour of the system starting from a wide variety of initial distributions. If so, then one could say that the ultimate degree of inequality in the system is independent of the initial inequality, determined jointly by the nature of consumer preferences and the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
Is the resource allocation produced by this cash-in-advance monetary system an efficient one? Surely it is an improvement on autarky, for the ability to accumulate cash gives households some ability to insure against high taste shocks. Yet in any period there are some individuals who are both short on cash and eager enough to consume to be willing to borrow at interest against their future endowment income to do so. There are others with large cash holdings and less urgent consumption needs who would surely be willing to lend. The 
These equations describe optimal individual behaviour, given the price Q. To determine the equilibrium value of Q, we use the fact that average share holdings both before and after trading must be unity. Then (17) implies: 
ln (at,,) = ln [h(0t)] -ln {E[h(0)]} + ln (at). (20)
This is a random walk with drift, and since ln (x) is a concave function, the drift term has a negative expected value. From this, we conclude that the variance of the log of share holdings (and from (i6) of the log of consumption, too) is growing linearly, without bound. We conclude as well (paralleling Thomas and Worrall (I990) exactly) that every household's consumption is going to zero with probability one. Yet mean consumption is constant at y. The situation is one of ever growing inequality, with wealth concentrated in an ever shrinking number of ever wealthier households. These dynamics, which follow even from an initial situation of equality, surely do not conform to our customary images of a well functioning society. But are they economically inefficient? The answer, as we will see in the next section, is yes and no.
V. EFFICIENCY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
The two very different market allocations worked out in the last two sections both have the feature that an individual with a high current shock can obtain higher current consumption by surrendering claims to future consumptions. In the monetary equilibrium this could be done, up to a point, by running down cash holdings. In the credit economy the same end is achieved by selling off future endowment holdings. These two examples obviously do not exhaust the range of market opportunities one might postulate and explore, but in this section I will return instead to the hypothetical planning problem introduced in Section II. In this case, however, the planner is assumed not to have access to any source of information about individual shocks. This is the case studied The Bellman equation (3) is more difficult with the incentive constraint (2 1) imposed than in the full-information case, but we have built up some intuition about it from the analyses of the full-information case and of the pure credit economy. Based on these cases, one would conjecture that for general CRRA preferences the solution v(a) takes the form of a constant times ad, and that in the log case it takes the form v(a) = A + B ln (a). In either case it is reasonable to conjecture that both current consumption and end-of-period shares will be proportional to initial shares, or that efficient allocations will take the form c(a, 6) = r(6) a and g(a, 0) =f(6) a for some functions r andf of 6.' I will focus here on the log case only. It is a straightforward calculation to show that at the efficient allocation A, the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption is higher for agent 2 than for agent i, which is to say that the point A lies below the contract curve.6 This is enough to show that the pure credit equilibrium point C is inefficient. It is also enough to show that the efficient allocation cannot be maintained if agents are free to engage in unmonitored borrowing and lending: If A is treated as a post-insurance-payment endowment point and if people are free to trade from this point, agent I will exchange some of his current goods in return for claims to future goods.
There is some latitude in defining a market equilibrium in this contextwhat are the commodities assumed to be traded? -but I take the fact that A is off the contract curve to mean that the efficient allocation cannot be implemented through competitive exchange. It is true that a financial intermediary acting exactly as the hypothetical social planner of this section could deliver A to his clients, and with a continuum of agents, there is room for many such intermediaries. But such an intermediary would need to be able to monitor and prevent all exchange on the part of its clients. This capability seems to me well beyond that possessed by any actual private institution. ' The distributional dynamics of the efficient allocation are evidently identical in form to those of the pure credit equilibrium. Each consumer's share 6 Atkeson and Lucas (I99I). Section 9. This is the conclusion reached, by similar reasoning, in Hammond (I989).
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THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH entitlements follow (in logs) a random walk with negative drift: equation (20) with the function h(0) replaced by f(O). The problem with the pure credit equilibrium is not that inequality grows but only that it may not grow at the efficient rate. We are accustomed to thinking of insurance as a consumption equaliser, but that intuition is based on full-insurance models like that of Section II. With the partial insurance necessitated by private information, we can channel consumption to currently needy consumers in excess of market levels only by*penalising their future claims in excess of market levels. In summary, it is convergence to a finite-variance limiting distribution, as in the monetary equilibrium of Section III, that is a symptom of inefficiency, not the ever increasing inequality of the pure credit equilibrium of Section IV. The credit equilibrium is inefficient, but only because it provides inadequate insurance against a high consumption urgency. When this deficiency is remedied, necessarily by non-market means, the growing inequality of the credit equilibrium is not merely preserved but may even be accentuated.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
I said at the outset that my formulation would be a little too abstract for immediate application. Now that the exposition is complete, I doubt that any of you seriously disagrees. But not all abstractions are equally useful, and I want to conclude by asking whether the issues I have focused on this afternoon constitute a large part of what we mean by the problem of distribution, or a minor part, or no part at all.
In focusing on uninsurable risk and ways of dealing with it, I believe I have been discussing pretty much the whole problem. (In saying this, I refer of course to risks of all kinds -shocks to endowments as well as those I have called taste shocks.) If the children of Noah had been able and willing to pool risks, Arrow-Debreu style, among themselves and their descendants, then the vast inequality we see today, within and across societies, would not exist, and those whose ancestors had the talent and luck to participate most fully in the industrial revolution would be remitting a good part of their return to those whose did not. The study of distribution is, over a long enough time period, the study of social mobility, and one cannot discuss social mobility without reference to uninsured individual risks.
In order to view the processes analysed in this article as occurring slowly over long periods it is necessary, of course, to think of the typical household in these models as representing a family of successive generations. Viewed in this way, the positive analysis of the credit equilibrium rests on the assumption that each agent has unlimited ability to sell off the endowments of his heirs to meet his own current needs. He does so, I have assumed, altruistically, but subject to no externally imposed limits. In the same way, the normative analysis rests on an efficiency criterion that treats each currently alive person as the sole spokesman for his yet-to-be-born descendants. In ordering differing allocation schemes, the hypothetical social planner does not recognise members of future generations as distinct individuals whose preferences must be taken into account.
Perhaps it makes more sense to view the theory I have reviewed as applying 1992]
ON EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTION 247 to individuals during their own lifetimes, with the process starting anew for each generation. This interpretation would bring the positive theory I have offered into closer agreement with fact, since we do observe ever-increasing inequality over the lifetime of members of a given cohort. Could the normative analysis I have reviewed be reworked under an efficiency criterion that assigns independent weight to the members of future generations, without denying altogether the fundamental role of intrafamilial altruism? It is time, I think, for welfare economics to deal seriously with the economics of the family, and I will not be disappointed if the conclusions of the analysis I have described in this lecture are cited in support of this belief.
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